Spaceflight as a Question of Power: Europe’s Path to the Margins of the Lunar Age: Technologically Strong, Strategically Weak

The return to the Moon is developing into a new geopolitical race between the United States and China. Both countries are planning ambitious missions to the lunar surface and pursuing a long-term objective: the establishment of permanent bases. Unlike the historic Apollo missions, the focus this time is not merely on symbolic landings, but on a sustained human presence in space.

The competition is intense, as both the United States and China are investing heavily in space technologies, infrastructure, and international partnerships. A permanent lunar base would not only carry significant prestige, but could also serve as a strategic launching point for further missions, such as those to Mars. In addition, it would enable scientific research under conditions never before possible.

A key incentive lies in access to the Moon’s resources. These include rare raw materials, water ice in the polar regions, and materials that could be used for energy production or construction in space. Whoever establishes a lasting presence first could secure decisive advantages. The new race to the Moon is therefore not only a technological endeavor, but also a political and economic contest of global significance.

The renewed race to the Moon marks a profound turning point in international spaceflight. What long appeared to be a distant future scenario has now become a central arena of geopolitical, economic, and technological competition. While individual spacefaring nations are pursuing clear strategies and deliberately expanding their presence on the Moon, Europe is facing the sobering realization that past decisions have constrained its current options. The following analysis examines this development as a sequence of strategic misjudgments and omissions, illustrating how Europe has gradually shifted from a potential leadership role to a predominantly supportive position in the new lunar era.

1. Early Focus on Cooperation Instead of Autonomy

Mistake (1970s–1990s): 

Europe early on prioritized international cooperation, particularly with the United States, rather than defining independent strategic objectives in spaceflight. While this approach provided access to missions and expertise, it prevented the development of:

an autonomous human spaceflight capability, and
independent long-term exploration goals (the Moon, later Mars).

Cooperation came to replace strategic sovereignty.

2. Renunciation of Human Spaceflight Systems and Heavy-Lift Capabilities

Mistake (1990s–2000s): 

While other spacefaring nations systematically developed:

crewed spacecraft, and
heavy-lift launch vehicles.

Europe concentrated on uncrewed missions and supplier roles. This effectively predetermined that Europe:

would not define mission profiles independently, and
would not control direct access to lunar missions.

The consequences of this decision persist to this day.

3. Persistent Underfunding Amid Rising Ambitions

Mistake (2000s–2010s): 

Europe articulated increasingly ambitious goals but failed to match them with:

comparable budgets, and
long-term funding commitments.

The European Space Agency learned to “do much with little,” but this resulted in:

project delays,
insufficient critical mass for large-scale initiatives, and.
structural dependence on partners.

Efficiency became a stopgap, not a strength.

4. Fragmentation Driven by National Interests

Mistake (2010s): 

With the expansion of the EU and the ESA, the following intensified:

national vetoes,
narrowly defined industrial policy interests, and
complex funding allocation mechanisms.

Strategic decisions became slower, more cautious, and frequently diluted. While other actors set clear priorities, Europe lost valuable time—a critical disadvantage in the new race to the Moon.

5. Neglect of Commercial Spaceflight

Mistake (2010s–early 2020s): 

Europe responded late to the rise of private space companies. It lacked:

risk-tolerant funding instruments,
regulatory clarity, and
political determination to systematically integrate new actors.

As a result, few European counterparts emerged to rival U.S. “New Space” companies with global reach.

6. Strategic Vulnerability Through External Dependencies

Mistake (late 2010s–2020s): 

Geopolitical crises exposed the extent of Europe’s dependence:

on non-European launch systems,
on foreign human spaceflight programs, and
on external political frameworks.

These dependencies had long been known but were politically tolerated.

7. The Current Risk of Marginalization in the Lunar Era

Mistake (Present Day): 

While the United States and China view the Moon as:

a geopolitical domain,
an economic resource, and
a strategic springboard.

Europe remains largely a technical partner. Without a course correction, Europe risks:

limited influence over rules and resource access,
diminished prestige, and
a permanent junior role in space exploration.

Conclusion

Europe’s shortcomings are the result of a cumulative process: each individual decision was rational in the short term, yet collectively produced a long-term structural disadvantage. The decisive failure lies not in a lack of capability, but in the repeated postponement of strategic decisions.

Europe’s greatest mistake is not insufficient competence, but insufficient political will to assume a leadership role. If Europe continues to cooperate rather than shape outcomes itself, it will remain technologically relevant but geopolitically secondary in the new lunar age.