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Political Miscalibration: The End of Europe’s Internal Combustion Engine Ban




Major political projects rarely fail because of a single decision. More often, it is a sequence of misjudgments that solidify over years, reinforce one another, and ultimately force a correction. The phase-out of internal combustion engines from 2035, decided by the European Union, is an exemplary case in point.

What began as a flagship climate policy project gradually developed into a field of conflict between climate targets, industrial realities, and political viability. The European Commission’s recent decision to abandon—or at least substantially soften—the de facto ban on new internal combustion engines should therefore be understood less as a sudden U-turn and more as a necessary response to a long chain of structural false assumptions.

This analysis does not view the combustion engine phase-out through the lens of political blame, but rather as a case study in policy mismanagement: Which assumptions proved false? Where were risks underestimated? And what consequences emerged from the interaction of climate policy, market mechanisms, and industrial policy constraints?

The following review of errors and their consequences places the Commission’s decision in this broader context and shows why the failure of the original concept is less an isolated misstep than the result of a systematic miscalibration of European regulatory policy.

Error 1: A Political Objective Without a Robust Feasibility Assessment
Error:
 
The EU decided on a de facto phase-out of internal combustion engines from 2035 on the basis of an ambitious political climate goal, without conducting a realistic and robust assessment of industrial, infrastructural, and market feasibility.
Consequences:
  • Regulation was based on assumptions (rapid expansion of charging infrastructure, stable demand for electric vehicles, competitive European battery production) that did not materialize.
  • Tensions between climate policy and industrial policy emerged early on.
  • Over time, the goal lost credibility.

Error 2: Equating “Zero Emissions” with “Electric”
Error: 
Although formally worded as technology-neutral, the objective was politically and regulatorily narrowed in practice to battery-electric vehicles. Alternative approaches (e-fuels, synthetic fuels, hybrid solutions) were marginalized.
Consequences:
  • Innovation pathways outside electromobility were economically devalued.
  • Manufacturers with strong internal combustion engine expertise came under structural adjustment pressure.
  • Political conflicts with member states advocating technological openness intensified.

Error 3: Underestimating the Industrial Policy Dimension
Error:
 
The European Commission treated the combustion engine phase-out primarily as a climate policy measure rather than as a profound industrial policy intervention in one of Europe’s key industries.
Consequences:
  • Competitive disadvantages vis-à-vis China and the United States were recognized too late.
  • Production shifts, investment restraint, and job concerns increased.
  • Political pressure from major automotive countries grew significantly.

Error 4: Assuming a Stable Political Consensus
Error:
 
The Commission assumed that the political compromise once reached would remain viable until 2035—despite changing majorities, economic crises, and geopolitical shifts.
Consequences:
  • National governments began openly questioning the objective.
  • The combustion engine phase-out became a symbol of political overregulation.
  • The credibility of long-term EU regulations was damaged.

Error 5: Course Correction Came Too Late
Error:
 
Warning signals from industry, markets, and member states were ignored or politically downplayed for years. The review of the 2035 target took place only under acute pressure.
Consequences:
  • The reversal appeared abrupt and poorly coordinated.
  • Planning certainty for manufacturers and investors was lost.
  • The impression of an erratic climate policy was reinforced.

Error 6: A Complex Compromise Instead of a Clear Reorientation
Error:
 
Instead of a fundamental reassessment, the European Commission opted for a technically and regulatorily complex interim solution (a 90 percent target, compensation mechanisms).
Consequences:
  • Regulation became difficult to understand and costly to implement.
  • Neither industry nor climate advocates are satisfied.
  • Legal and political follow-up conflicts are foreseeable.
Overall Consequence: Loss of Trust on Multiple Levels


From this chain of errors arise overarching consequences:

  • Loss of regulatory credibility for the EU.
  • Uncertainty for industry and investors.
  • Weakening of climate policy through political rollback.
  • Polarization between climate protection and economic interests.


The collapse of the combustion engine phase-out is not the result of a single political mistake, but the logical outcome of a cumulative chain of errors: from overambitious objectives and unrealistic assumptions to delayed and unclear corrections. 


The central lesson is clear: climate policy without an industry-policy reality check does not lead to transformation—it leads to retreat.